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Abstract
Background: Against a background of pandemic threat posed by SARS and avian H5N1 influenza, this study used
deliberative forums to elucidate informed community perspectives on aspects of pandemic planning.
Methods: Two deliberative forums were carried out with members of the South Australian community. The forums
were supported by a qualitative study with adults and youths, systematic reviews of the literature and the
involvement of an extended group of academic experts and policy makers. The forum discussions were recorded
with simultaneous transcription and analysed thematically.
Results: Participants allocated scarce resources of antiviral drugs and pandemic vaccine based on a desire to
preserve society function in a time of crisis. Participants were divided on the acceptability of social distancing and
quarantine measures. However, should such measures be adopted, they thought that reasonable financial,
household and psychological support was essential. In addition, provided such support was present, the
participants, in general, were willing to impose strict sanctions on those who violated quarantine and social
distancing measures.
Conclusions: The recommendations from the forums suggest that the implementation of pandemic plans in a
severe pandemic will be challenging, but not impossible. Implementation may be more successful if the public is
engaged in pandemic planning before a pandemic, effective communication of key points is practiced before and
during a pandemic and if judicious use is made of supportive measures to assist those in quarantine or affected by
social isolation measures.
Background
The emergence of a novel human influenza A (H1N1),
early in 2009, saw the implementation of national pan-
demic influenza (PI) plans around the world. These
plans had been developed, at the urging of the World
Health Organisation (WHO), partly in response to the
emergence of a virulent Avian Influenza A (H5N1) and
partly in response to the 2003 outbreak of Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), both of which demon-
strated gaps in global and local responses to infectious,
clinically severe respiratory diseases.
National plans [1] place considerable emphasis on
stockpiles of antiviral drugs and prototype vaccines for
H5N1 strains. A second significant aspect of national
pandemic planning is the use of isolation, quarantine
and social distancing measures [2]. These measures,
along with heightened hygiene compliance, appear to be
amongst the very limited tools available to buy the time
needed to produce and distribute an effective vaccine
[3-5]; and as such have been employed in many coun-
tries, albeit in a limited way, in response to the influenza
A (H1N1) 2009 pandemic.
The 2009 WHO Guidance document on Pandemic
Preparedness [1] emphasises the need for a whole of
society approach to pandemic planning. In particular, it
emphasises the important role of civil society organisa-
tions, families and individuals for an effective response
to a pandemic. A number of strategies to include citi-
zens in planning and to test the public acceptability of
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policy measures have been used. These include commu-
nity surveys [6-9], broad community engagement pro-
cesses [10], and deliberative forums [11].
Each strategy has advantages and disadvantages. Sur-
veys can inform policy decision-making through provid-
ing information about likely or actual public responses
to policy initiatives. For example, surveys can tell us
something about whether a community is likely to
respond cooperatively to a school closure. However, a
legitimate concern in gauging community views in this
way is that understanding in the community about com-
plex areas of healthcare planning and policy may be
weak. This may be particularly the case for new health
threats (such as a pandemic) and complex health policy
areas (such as decisions about who should have priority
access to scarce pharmaceuticals).
This methodological weakness may also apply to qua-
litative methods such as focus groups or interviews.
These approaches can tell us more about the reasons
that underpin a particular community response. How-
ever, qualitative methods will still suffer from the criti-
cism that community perspectives in this area are of
greatest value if accessed at the time of a health emer-
gency when there is likely to be more interest in and
access to information. Regardless of whether surveys or
qualitative methods are used, the general lack of knowl-
edge in the community about the emergence, transmis-
sion and management of respiratory epidemics may be a
drawback in collecting community views about pan-
demic planning. In addition, policy makers may question
the validity of citizen-driven decisions when the citizens
have limited access to information to adequately inform
those decisions.
For this reason, deliberative processes have been pro-
posed as an anticipatory tool which can gauge the views
of the community in policy areas that may generate
future issues but where there is little current public
debate [12]. Deliberative methods involve prolonged
engagement with community members and provision of
detailed information which the participants may draw
upon in their decision making. The theory underpinning
deliberative inclusive processes is that, given enough
information about a topic, a small representative sample
of the population can deliberate with conscience and
arrive at a decision which is informed, but also reflective
of community values. Deliberative inclusive processes
such as citizens’ juries and deliberative forums have
been used for looking at issues about health service pro-
vision and priority setting in health [13-15] and less
commonly for more complex policy issues such as: bio-
bank management [16,17], mammography screening cri-
teria [18], organ donation shortfalls [19], and genetic
testing debates [20,21]. The community perspectives
provided can support the development of policy that is
both responsive to community concerns and which
recognises the importance of community values and
beliefs in policy formation but they also fulfil a loftier
ideal of devolved democratic decision making [22].
In this paper, we describe the findings from FluViews
- a community consultation project held in 2008 that
elucidated community perspectives on some of the stra-
tegies proposed for pandemic planning in Australia. The
paper describes the findings from two deliberative for-
ums: the first explored the allocation of scarce pharma-
ceuticals in a pandemic; and the second examined more
complex questions about the use of social distancing
measures and quarantine restrictions.
Methods
Two deliberative forums were conducted in Adelaide in
2008 to consider the following questions:
Forum 1: Who should be given the scarce antiviral
drugs and vaccine in an influenza pandemic?
Forum 2: Under what circumstances would quarantine
and social distancing measures be acceptable in an influ-
enza pandemic?
Forum 1 met for one-day whereas forum 2 was over
2 days. Only forum 1 and the second day of forum 2 are
reported here. Other findings from forum 2, relating to
effective communication in a pandemic, and details of
the methods used, have been published previously [23].
Both forums used aspects of the citizens’ jury model
including: a steering group of academic experts and pol-
icy makers; random selection of participants to reflect
the population; delivery of information in an interactive,
accessible and non-threatening way; facilitation by an
independent facilitator; participant deliberation in small
groups and as a whole; and the formulation of a ‘ver-
dict’. The process differed from some models of citizens’
juries in that the forums were smaller and shorter. In
addition, we analysed the transcripts of the deliberations
using thematic analysis (methods described previously in
[23]) to elucidate further the underlying reasons for the
choices made and ensure that minority opinion was
included. We have used pseudonyms to identify partici-
pant quotes.
Preparation for the Forums
Four focus groups - two with adults and two with school-
children aged 16-17 - were used to determine the main
issues of concern and help frame suitable questions for the
forums. School children were included in this process
because many social distancing measures will adversely
impact on young people and because this group can be
important vectors in the spread of disease [24] as demon-
strated in the current swine flu outbreak. Supportive docu-
ments for the specialists and the forum participants were
based on systematic reviews summarising available
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evidence about pandemic influenza containment and man-
agement strategies. Policy makers working in pandemic
influenza planning engaged with project development
throughout.
Recruitment
Difficulties were encountered in recruiting enough parti-
cipants for forum 1: withdrawal for a variety of reasons
led to a forum with 9 participants, which was older and
with more females (n = 6) than males (n = 3). Forum 2
had a full quota of 12 participants. Other than age and
gender the distribution of demographic identifiers for
forum 1 was similar to that for forum 2 (described in
[23]). Honorariums of Aus$100 and Aus$300 were paid
to each participant in forums 1 and 2 respectively.
Assumptions
In both forums, the participants were asked to assume
that the influenza virus would cause moderate case mor-
bidity across age groups and moderate case mortality
although the jury was also told that in pandemics, the
usual epidemiology of flu may be reversed, so that
young adults get more disease than the elderly. The
forum was provided with case figures based on mathe-
matical modelling of a projected pandemic in South
Australia (G. Tucker, Department of Health, Govern-
ment of South Australia, Personal Communication)
using the FluAID software package [25] which remain
consistent with WHO planning recommendations [1]. In
forum 1 it was assumed that influenza infection was
geographically widespread and that initially there would
be sufficient antiviral drugs from the national and state
stockpiles to treat approximately 10% of the population
or provide prophylaxis to 5%. In forum 2, the partici-
pants were asked to deliberate using a series of six sce-
narios which sketched a range of situations in which
quarantine and social distancing measures might be
used (Table 1). There were opportunities for the partici-
pants to engage with the experts at all stages of the
deliberation and discussion.
Post-forum evaluation
Participants were contacted by telephone within four
weeks of the forum and asked to comment on the pro-
cess, the interaction with the specialists and whether
they agreed with the consensus findings of the forum in
which they had participated.
This study was approved by the Human Research
Ethics Committee of the University of Adelaide (H-176-
2006) and for the student focus groups by Community
and Tertiary Liaison, Department of Education and
Children’s services.
Results
Forum 1: Prioritisation of allocation of scarce resources
The initial list of potential recipients identified was
broad and eclectic and included:
health care workers; researchers and laboratory staff
dealing with pandemic influenza; military; essential
services (water, power, waste etc); people aged 2-30;
police and prison staff; paramedics and emergency
response personnel; primary producers and food
transport workers; communication workers; clergy;
parents and care workers, funeral organizations;
decision-makers; asylum seekers; prisoners; and
tourists.
Reasons for including these groups varied (Table 2)
but generally fell under three broad themes: groups that
would be in high demand for their services in a pan-
demic (health care workers, funeral organisations, emer-
gency response); groups that were essential to the
continued maintenance of societal function (essential
services, primary providers, food transport workers) and
vulnerable populations to which society owed a duty of
care (young people aged 2-30, asylum seekers, prisoners,
tourists). Several participants included people aged 2-30
years because this group was regarded as highly socially
interactive and seen as both at greater risk of infection
and an important conduit for the rapid spread of influ-
enza throughout the population. In addition, some
groups were selected for more than one reason. For
example, young people aged 2-30 years were also
included because, as one participant said, “They are the
future.”
The forum quickly realised that the numbers in these
groups were more than could possibly be covered by the
limited stockpiles then available. In refining the lists, the
forum discarded vulnerable groups such as asylum see-
kers and those groups considered peripheral to the pre-
servation of society. They also removed groups such as
the clergy and funeral organisations whose roles might
potentially be covered by others. Some groups, such as
prisoners, were considered to be at lower risk since
their incarceration might be considered a form of social
distancing. Most of the participants did not distinguish
between antiviral drugs and vaccine, and felt distribution
patterns should be similar for both.
In constructing the lists, the forum participants
acknowledged that they would not benefit themselves
from the choices they made. They explicitly excluded
the elderly and the chronically ill from the list because
they felt that the elderly were “not the future“, would be
“more drain than help“ for an already “depleted society”.
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Table 1 Scenarios used with forum 2
Order Scenario Should quarantine/social distancing be required?
1 Miriam has recently returned from a ten week work placement in an
infected country. One person on her flight developed a fever on the
flight, but it is not yet known if the person is infected with the pandemic
strain of influenza. Miriam has been asked by the health official at the
airport to remain at home in quarantine. Miriam’s husband is still
travelling and Miriam knows there is no food in the house.
Miriam should comply, provided she has enough support at
home.
2 South Australia is in week two of the pandemic. Miriam died yesterday.
Her husband David has rushed home from aboard and was at her
bedside when she died. He has been issued with a formal order to
remain in quarantine for the next seven days. Miriam and David’s religion
requires that the body be buried within 24 hours. Miriam had a large
extended family, was very active in the community and had many friends
but David has been told that only the immediate family can attend the
funeral.
Forum divided on whether attendance at funeral should be
restricted (including whether David should be prohibited from
going).
3 Kimberley gets a call to tell her that Rob has been diagnosed as ill with
the pandemic strain of influenza. Kimberley and Rob had lunch together
at a hotel yesterday. At the time he complained of not feeling well and
said he would be visiting the doctor that afternoon. Kimberley is very
worried that she has been exposed. She knows that if she goes into
quarantine voluntarily she will be unable to work for up to seven days
and it may be longer if she becomes ill. She works for a small bakery
franchise and is aware the manager is already having staff problems. If
she does not turn up for work today and tomorrow, the store may not
open. Kimberley is a single parent has no savings and is totally reliant on
her income from the bakery for daily living expenses. She is anxious
about infecting her children if she continues to live with them, but she
has no alternative sources of child care.
Forum divided:
a. Kimberley should seek more information about obligations
(with a view to going into quarantine)
b. Kimberley would/should just go home (and pretend nothing
has happened)
4 There have been only a small number of influenza cases in South
Australia but several hundred in Sydney. The Premier is considering
closing schools. Year 12 exams are in five weeks.
Forum divided:
a. Schools should be closed
b. Not enough evidence yet to close schools
5 Margaret, Wilma’s daughter is the chairperson of a rural school council.
The Premier has closed all schools and childcare services in the State just
when farmers in the area are sowing their annual crops. Margaret realises
that many farming families will not be able to care for their children and
sow the crops. She decides to organise a home based community
childcare service. Families are placed on a roster to provide care for up to
15 children each day. The arrangement continues for about four weeks
until the busiest part of the sowing season is over.
Forum divided:
a. Make an exception to social isolation measures in certain
situations such as these
b. No exceptions; childcare arrangements should be closed
down.
6 Wilma has gone to church nearly every Sunday for most of her life and
she has begun attending on weekdays. She has heard that the Premier
has closed schools and banned all public gatherings, including club
meetings and church services. Wilma is very anxious about missing
church. On the other hand, she is also worried about catching flu.
Forum divided:
a. Ban all social gatherings, including religious services
b. Religious gatherings should be allowed to continue
Table 2 Ranking and rationale for groups to receive antiviral drugs and vaccine in a severe pandemic
Rank-Sector Rationale Typical Supporting Quotation
1st - Health care workers Essential to provision of medical
services for PI and non-PI patients
“[They] need to administer the medicine to people, and also, obviously, see to
any other illnesses and sicknesses that are going on together at the same time.”
2nd - Vaccine and antiviral
drug production workers
Ensuring the timely supply of
developed vaccines and drugs
“If we don’t have any of those guys around and they get sick, no vaccine gets
developed; we are in big trouble.”
Equal 3rd -Essential services Maintenance of fabric of society “The essential services have to keep the society running. When there is no
electricity, water etc the whole system will collapse”
Equal 3rd - Military Multi-skilled and experienced in
disaster management
“. . . transportation of fuel, et cetera, and any other things that might come
along like that mobile hospitals and that sort of stuff.”
PI = pandemic influenza
Braunack-Mayer et al. BMC Public Health 2010, 10:501
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/10/501
Page 4 of 9
Some participants expressed the opinion that elderly
people would prefer that a younger person have priority
access to the vaccine or antiviral drug.
ROSEMARY: If you asked every elderly person
whether they thought they should have it or their
family, they would say their family.
In rank ordering the list, deliberations focussed on
preservation of society in a time of crisis. The final
choices, in order, and quotes from participants summar-
ising the forum’s reasoning are shown in Table 2.
Protecting the health of health care workers was seen
as a way of protecting the well-being of all, since health
care workers would be needed not only by those requir-
ing health care services for treatment for the effects of
influenza infection, but also for more routine medical
needs. In addition, health care workers were seen as
essential in the roll-out of the vaccine once developed:
STEPHANIE: I think the main reason I put it [health
care workers] was so they would be there. People
could come to the hospitals to be vaccinated.
Vaccine and antiviral drug production workers were
considered essential and irreplaceable and to be so small
in number as to be a relatively small drain on limited
resources. The other choices were considered indispen-
sable to preserve social structure and order by maintain-
ing essential services. If forced to choose between
preserving society in the long run and saving the most
lives, the forum indicated that they would choose to
maintain social functioning.
ADRIANA: Accepting there will be casualties, but
life has to go on.
In particular, the forum wished to uphold a life style
that ensured personal independent living through con-
tinued access to essential services.
In selecting the military for the list, the forum had no
particular expectation of violence, panic or disruption of
society; rather, they had a favorable view of the military
in a jurisdictional and humanitarian role which would
assist in maintaining a structured and orderly commu-
nity. The forum regarded the military as a useful
resource which could assist with policing, medical and
paramedical services, transport, essential services, cha-
plaincy and crude manpower and logistical support.
One of the forum participants (Stephanie) chose to
dissent from the consensus opinion and prioritised sick
people and their contacts and children in the top three.
The participant questioned supporting society function
if we did not also save “the most important generation“.
In the feedback interview, several of the participants
commented that some provision should have been made
for children. Feedback suggested that at least some of
the participants were not entirely comfortable with the
choices they had to make under the constraint of lim-
ited resources. For example, one participant in the feed-
back session said:
CATHERINE: I want the children to live and they
have to carry on. They are our future.
The forum recognized that not all members of the
chosen groups would need to receive the vaccine and
that other measures such as quarantined workplaces
might be used to protect some groups without the need
for antiviral prophylaxis.
Lastly, the participants indicated their willingness to
accept some increase in income tax now as a form of
insurance against the threat of an emergent pandemic
strain. These resources would be allocated to promoting
better personal hygiene in the population, as economic
aid to improve practice in the keeping and butchering
of domestic fowl in developing countries, and to
improve channels for informing the Australian public in
a measured way and in advance about the threat. Forum
members were reassured that the Government had
made preparations, but were concerned that they were
neither aware of these preparations nor knew how to
prepare personally for a pandemic. The forum indicated
it was the Government’s duty to inform them of the
risks and how to prepare.
Forum 2: Consideration of quarantine and social
distancing measures
Acceptability of quarantine and social distancing measures
Overall, the forum was divided with respect to the need
for quarantine and social distancing measures. (See
Table 1) Some of the participants were in favour of
mandatory quarantine and social distancing measures;
others considered that a policy of voluntary quarantine
and social distancing should be adopted. This finding
held across the full range of scenarios, with the excep-
tion of Scenario 1 for which there was unanimous
agreement that quarantine was warranted, provided
there was enough support for quarantined individuals.
The range of responses can be explained by three rea-
sons that emerged in the forum. First, the forum
thought that, regardless of the importance and reason-
ableness of quarantine and social distancing measures,
not all members of the community would comply.
Second, the forum recognised that quarantine and social
distancing measures would create social and emotional
burdens which would influence people’s willingness and
capacity to comply with restrictions. For example, the
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forum participants expressed a range of views when dis-
cussing whether, in Scenario 2, quarantined David should
be allowed to go to his wife’s funeral.
TAYLA: I would sacrifice one person’s happiness for
the rest of the country’s.
KAREN: That way if you were David -
TAYLA: I would understand.
MELISSA: He didn’t see her for ten weeks...
RAELENE: My father died when I was a child ...I am
very angry I wasn’t allowed to go to his funeral
because I was a child ... I can definitely say for David
it would be a horrible experience knowing he wasn’t
going to be at the funeral of his wife...
JAMES: Should you be allowed to put yourself at
risk knowing you could pass it on to other people?
It’s irresponsible...
Finally, the forum recognised that quarantine and
social distancing measures, while serving some good
purposes, might also undermine others, such as the
importance attached to the preservation of community
morale. They thought that maintaining a sense of opti-
mism during a pandemic would be important for the
wellbeing of the whole community. The forum was
divided on how important such opportunities to meet
would be to the maintenance of community functioning.
Some participants felt more strongly than others about
opportunities for sporting and religious groups to meet.
JAMES: ...If you are going to allow it [social gather-
ings], you have to allow all religious groups to do it.
Does that include sporting clubs?
KAREN: With church, I think spiritual wellbeing is
pretty important during times of crisis like
pandemics.
MELISSA: The sports one, it would be an impact
but not a massive huge one...It’s not a necessity. It’s
not something you have to go to.
RAELENE: Religion is not a necessity either...
KAREN: To people who are religious it is a
necessity.
Participants’ views, and hence their support for social
distancing measures, were influenced by their perception
of the salience of the risk. They were less supportive if
they considered that the risk was remote geographically.
Opinion varied as to what constituted geographical
remoteness; for some participants, the distance from
Adelaide to Sydney was small, whereas for others Syd-
ney was distant.
Supporting the community during a pandemic
The forum also considered the level of support that
should be provided to those directly influenced by
quarantine or social distancing measures. With the aid
of the facilitator, the participants compiled a list of areas
in which support could be provided; they were then
asked to nominate the level of support that should be
supplied. Although they had been divided on the ques-
tion of whether social distancing and quarantine mea-
sures were acceptable, they were almost unanimous on
the need for generous support for people affected by
quarantine or social isolation. All or nearly all partici-
pants wanted at least partial income replacement (25%
wanted full income replacement); deferral of debts;
guaranteed return to work if leave was taken for reasons
related to pandemic influenza (for example because of a
quarantine restriction); food parcels; maintenance of uti-
lities (even if bills could not be paid); and telephone
counselling.
Much of the forum’s discussion of financial support
reflected the participants’ assessment that the use of
quarantine and social isolation measures in a pandemic
could place job security at risk. They wanted to ensure
that those members of the community who went into
quarantine to protect others should not be penalised in
relation to employment.
JANE: There would have to be something to allow
that to happen, where there is no discrimination
against the person, where they are not going to risk
losing their job because they have been told “Sorry
you have to go into quarantine”.
How feasible it would be to compensate all income
earners rather than to assign priority to those on a low
income was not addressed.
Sanctions and enforcement
The forum was asked to nominate a range of enforce-
ment measures and then indicate their level of support
for these measures. It is important to note that the par-
ticipants were assuming that adequate financial, house-
hold and psychological support would be in place before
these measures would be imposed.
The participants’ responses to this question were sur-
prising. As indicated above, they had expressed a range
of views about the adoption of mandatory quarantine
and social distancing measures. Yet, when asked to con-
sider how quarantine or social distancing measures
should be enforced, in general they were willing to
impose strict sanctions on people who did not comply.
The forum was unanimous in endorsing that some level
of sanction or penalty should be applied to people who
violated quarantine or social distancing orders. Nearly
all participants (11/12) agreed that warnings, cautions
and fines for infringements were appropriate; most (9/
12) considered that monitoring the activities of those
who had infringed quarantine or social distancing
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requirements was acceptable (for example through regu-
lar telephone calls); and half thought that gaol terms for
violators would be acceptable.
In summary, participants were divided on the accept-
ability of social distancing and quarantine measures.
However, should such measures be adopted, they
thought that generous financial, household and psycho-
logical support was essential. In addition, provided such
support was present, the participants were in general
willing to impose strict sanctions on those who violated
quarantine and social distancing measures.
Discussion
Our study has a number of implications for policy
makers. First, it suggests that citizens can provide impor-
tant information about community values and beliefs
which may impact on the acceptability and success of
pandemic containment and response strategies. Current
management plans for pandemic influenza in Australia
focus on health management, business continuity and
information for individual households preparing for a
pandemic. A number of the strategies mentioned by par-
ticipants in forum 2 have already been included in
Australia’s pandemic influenza planning [4]. For example,
there are strategies in place to support people in quaran-
tine (through telephone support) [4] and to provide clear
and consistent information [26]. There is also recognition
of the psychosocial aspects of isolation, quarantine and
social distancing measures [27]. In a pandemic, these
strategies will be important to enhance compliance and
reduce adverse psychosocial effects.
Our findings suggest, though, that these forms of sup-
port may need to be augmented. The participants con-
sidered that more comprehensive support was needed to
compensate individuals for the difficulties that would
arise as a result of quarantine or social distancing mea-
sures and to help assure compliance with these mea-
sures. In particular, financial support to compensate for
lost income or to protect against the possibility of loss
of income, and emotional support to help those in quar-
antine were deemed important. This type of support is
not unprecedented. Job protection and income support
were provided by affected countries during the SARS
epidemic (summarised in [28]). Along with inability to
access health care, loss of income and loss of job or
business were the most frequently cited worries in a
four nation survey about attitudes to quarantine [6].
Means-tested financial support for quarantine, early in a
pandemic, when the case load is low and quarantine is
one of the few effective tools available, may be a useful
addition to pandemic management plans.
Similarly, forum 1 reflected how an informed public
might react to scarcity of effective preventive resources
in a pandemic. We know that, during the H1N1
pandemic influenza in Australia in 2009, stocks of anti-
viral drugs ran low because of demands from fearful but
low risk individuals in the community. This may have
been, in part, a consequence of the paucity of transpar-
ent and informed pre-pandemic debate about the use of
scarce anti-viral drugs and vaccines. It would seem that
this provides some support for forum 1’s recommenda-
tion that the community be better informed and pre-
pared for a pandemic.
Second, the findings give an indication of possible
community responses, should quarantine and social dis-
tancing measures be mandated by law. The recent pre-
paredness to enact emergency powers in the wake of the
Influenza A (H1N1) 2009 outbreak suggests that govern-
ments at state and national levels in Australia recognise
that voluntary compliance with social distancing and
quarantine measures may be inadequate and that enfor-
cement may be required. Our findings indicate that,
even amongst participants who have had the opportu-
nity to learn more about these measures, the enforce-
ment of quarantine and social distancing measures is
likely to receive a mixed response, unless supportive
measures are deemed adequate. There is a need to
ensure that adequate support strategies are in place to
guarantee that people are not unduly disadvantaged
financially by quarantine or social distancing. If ade-
quate financial, household and psychological support is
available, the findings from our forum indicate that the
community may accept a range of measures, including
cautions, warnings and fines.
Finally, the forums suggest that informing the public
about the issues associated with pandemic planning and
engaging the public in pandemic planning may mitigate
opposition to the measures. The consensus of opinion
for resource allocation emerging from the deliberations
of forum 1 is much closer to the proposed scheme for
distribution in a severe pandemic outlined in the Austra-
lian national pandemic plan (AHMPPI) [4] than that
obtained from a statewide survey without prior delibera-
tion conducted shortly before the forum [7] in which the
participants prioritised the elderly and children. The
priority groups selected in forum 1 fit well with the
AHMPPI which, in a severe pandemic, contains provision
for ‘the need to maintain functioning of critical infra-
structure’ while prioritising pre- and post-prophylaxis for
health care workers and some other occupational groups.
The participants themselves identified the importance of
preparing the community in advance [23]. Such prepara-
tion could lay the groundwork for effective communica-
tion in a pandemic which would moderate the potential
for media overstatement and fear mongering [29,30].
It is apparent, however, that the choices made by the
participants in the forums are, to a degree, uniquely
Australian. For example, the inclusion of the military in
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the prioritised list must be considered in the context of
the favourable Australian experience with the role of the
Australian military in providing effective humanitarian
relief in disaster situations. This finding underlines the
importance of attending to local cultural beliefs and
values in the development of the policy response [1].
Conclusions
Effective implementation of pandemic plans is likely to
be crucial for the successful management of a pandemic,
particularly if the emergent virus is highly virulent.
Countries will face particular challenges in the distribu-
tion of scarce resources in a pandemic and in imple-
menting suitable quarantine and social isolation
measures, not least because of the unique geographic,
cultural, historical and social circumstances of each set-
ting. It is difficult in this situation to develop evidence
based strategies on which to base implementation. Thus,
deliberative forums can provide local sources of evi-
dence for planners and implementers of pandemic pol-
icy, and anticipate local issues which may support or
impede successful implementation of plans.
However, like much public health policy, in the main
pandemic planning has been carried out with little pub-
lic consultation. Our study provides an exemplar for the
use of deliberative process in community involvement in
pandemic planning. However, like other methods, delib-
erative forums also suffer from drawbacks, in particular
with respect to the representativeness of views presented
in small forums. These issues may limit the acceptability
of deliberative methods to policy-makers looking to use
community views in informing policy decisions. In addi-
tion, questions have also been raised about the capacity
of citizens’ juries to elicit rational deliberation [31].
The findings of this study and other deliberative pro-
cesses also raise questions about the usefulness of this
approach in meeting the democratic ideal of including
the public in decision making for public policy. We
would suggest that deliberative forums such as the ones
described in this study can form the basis for broader
engagement with the community around the evidence
through a publicity campaign to initiate broader discus-
sion of the issues.
Understanding of community views on pandemic
response strategies is relatively new. What is known is
based on surveys of views about resource allocation and
mitigation measures in a pandemic [6-9] and through a
small number of public engagement projects [10,11].
There are similarities and differences in the findings
from each of these studies, indicating that we are likely
to need a range of approaches to build a comprehensive
picture of community views about pandemic planning.
That picture will also vary with local context, suggesting
that we will also need to adjust our pandemic planning
to take account of locally important factors.
The recommendations from the forums in this study
suggest that the distribution of scarce resources and the
implementation of quarantine and social distancing
measures in Australia in a severe pandemic will be chal-
lenging, but not impossible. Implementation may be
more successful if the public have more opportunities to
become informed and to express their informed judge-
ments about the issues in advance of a severe pandemic
and if prudent use is made of supportive measures to
assist those in quarantine or affected by social isolation
measures.
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